Relationships involve more than what two people think. They also involve what each believes the other thinks, and what each believes the other understands about them. Laing’s account of interpersonal perspectives separates these levels so that agreement, misunderstanding and assumed understanding can be examined more precisely.
One conversation, several perspectives
The appendix to Self and Others introduces a notation for dyadic perspectives: perspectives within a relationship between two people. Laing distinguishes someone’s view of themselves, their view of another person, and their view of that other person’s view. He argues that these apparently elaborate distinctions enter ordinary relationships, family exchanges and psychotherapy. [1]
The appendix makes successful attribution a relational achievement:
Only if two people carry out reciprocally ‘successful’ acts of attribution can any genuine relationship between them begin.
R. D. Laing — Self and Others (second edition), p. 154 [1]
For example, “I feel uncertain”, “I think you are uncertain”, and “I think you believe I am uncertain” describe different positions. Evidence for one does not automatically establish another. A person may be very sure of their own uncertainty while being mistaken about what somebody else believes.
This page explains the framework through Self and Others and “Us and Them” in The Politics of Experience. The appendix points to the fuller treatment by Laing, Phillipson and Lee in 1966. It is not a review of their complete book Interpersonal Perception. [1]
Three levels that should be kept distinct
In The Politics of Experience, Laing separates agreement from understanding, and then asks whether that understanding or misunderstanding is itself recognised. The following table translates those distinctions into an invented example about two people deciding where to spend a holiday. [2]
Laing’s first level concerns the people’s positions themselves, before their beliefs about each other are considered:
On level 1, two people, or two groups, may agree or disagree.
R. D. Laing — The Politics of Experience, p. 66 [2]
| Level | Question | Illustration |
|---|---|---|
| Positions | What does each person prefer? | Both would prefer to stay at home. |
| Understanding | What does each think the other prefers? | Each mistakenly believes the other wants to travel. |
| Recognition of understanding | What does each think the other understands about their own preference? | Each believes the other knows they would rather stay at home. |
The two people can consequently experience a trip as an unwanted sacrifice made for the other. Their actual agreement has not become a shared understanding. The example is a logical illustration, not a case from Laing or evidence that this pattern explains a particular disagreement.
Understanding does not require agreement
Two people may understand their disagreement accurately. Conversely, people who hold the same position may badly misunderstand one another. Laing’s scheme makes these combinations explicit instead of treating agreement as proof of successful communication. [2]
The distinction is practical. “We disagree about the plan, and each can state the other’s reasons” describes a different situation from “We agree, but each thinks the other is opposed.” An attempt to resolve the first by explaining preferences again may miss the substantive disagreement. An attempt to resolve the second through compromise may preserve a misunderstanding that could have been clarified.
A further complication concerns whether someone knows they have been understood. I may correctly understand your preference while you remain convinced that I have misunderstood it. Repetition and frustration can then persist despite accuracy at one level.
Nested assumptions and lost feedback
Laing’s appendix illustrates increasingly nested perspectives through examples involving apology, flattery, jealousy and exchanges between spouses. In the apology example, a child’s belief that an adult accepts a performance of remorse is distinguished from what the adult actually understands. The adult may recognise the performance while allowing the exchange to conclude. [1]
The formal complexity serves a particular purpose: it prevents the interpreter from collapsing several viewpoints into one. Saying that someone “has been deceived” requires more than observing what another person intended them to believe. Their own understanding still needs investigation.
Laing also describes a situation in which speculation about the other’s speculation becomes increasingly detached from direct feedback. His historical account of such a position does not establish that every complex inference is a sign of illness. The methodological concern is whether the participants can revise their assumptions in response to what actually happens. [1]
The observer has a perspective too
An interviewer or therapist does not stand outside these difficulties with automatic access to everyone’s experience. A report of what someone thinks is evidence about their report; a theory about what they really think adds an interpretation. The appendix ends with an exchange in which competing claims to know the other’s mind are themselves part of the conflict. [1]
Using the framework responsibly means identifying the source of each claim. Did the person state this preference? Did the other person infer it? Does the observer have evidence from both? These questions make an account more accountable without pretending that anyone can eliminate interpretation entirely.
The distinction connects with attributions and injunctions: a claim about another person’s experience can become a demand about what they should feel or acknowledge. It also connects with mystification when the person’s own account is displaced by an authoritative interpretation.
A framework for questions, not mind-reading
Laing’s notation helps specify where accounts diverge. It cannot determine the truth of a private experience by itself, prove deception, or decide whose version should prevail. Its value lies in distinguishing questions that are often run together.
For the surrounding relational argument, see Self and Others explained. For the distinction between recognising a person and agreeing with them, see confirmation and disconfirmation.
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References and source notes
- Laing, R. D. (1969). Self and Others. Revised second edition. Pantheon Books.Cited: appendix, pp. 154–155; p. 154; appendix, p. 154, footnote; appendix, pp. 155–158; appendix, pp. 158–159; appendix, pp. 159–160.
- Laing, R. D. (1967). The Politics of Experience and The Bird of Paradise. Penguin Books, 1970 reprint.Cited: chapter 4, pp. 65–68; p. 66; chapter 4, pp. 66–68.